its proper place. This does not preclude omitting the qualification “if Allah wills” when one means, “I affirm the truth,” for a person can be certain of the affirmation in his heart without being certain that he is complying with everything he has been commanded to do. Likewise, he can be certain that he loves Allah and His Messenger, hates disbelief, and possesses other such qualities that he knows are in his heart. The same applies if he means that he is outwardly a believer: he is not prevented from stating with certainty what he knows.

What is condemned is only what the scholars generally condemned in the doctrine of the Murji’ah, who say that faith is identical in all who possess it, just as every person has a head. Thus, one of them says, “I am truly a believer,” “I am a believer in Allah’s sight,” and similar statements, just as someone says, “I truly have a head,” or “In Allah’s knowledge, I truly have a head.” Whoever makes a categorical declaration on this basis has excluded inward and outward deeds from faith. The Companions, the Successors, and all the Muslims who followed them regard this as a reprehensible and false statement. People’s discussions of “the question of qualifying declarations of faith” will be addressed in their proper place.

The point here is that there are two extreme positions: the view that Islam consists solely in the verbal profession, with outward deeds falling outside the meaning of Islam; and the view that Islam and faith mean the same thing. Both are weak positions that contradict the hadith of Gabriel and the other hadiths of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

Thus, when Muhammad ibn Nasr al-Marwazī defended the second position, he had no proof establishing its correctness. Instead, he relied on evidence that invalidates the first position. He cited Allah’s words concerning the Bedouins:

“Rather, it is Allah who has conferred a favor upon you by guiding you to faith, if you are truthful.”

He said: “This indicates that ‘Islam’ is faith.”