that are outward and which he described as openly performed—not that this establishes a difference or opposition in meaning between Islam and faith. There is no evidence here that they differ in ruling.

He said:

They come together in a single servant who is both a Muslim and a believer. The convictions of the heart that he mentioned describe that servant’s heart, while the outward actions he mentioned describe his body.

He also said:

The community is agreed that if a servant believes in all the convictions of the heart mentioned in the description of faith in the hadith of Gabriel, but does not perform the actions mentioned in the description of Islam, he is not called a believer. Likewise, if he performs everything by which Islam was described but does not hold the beliefs by which faith was described, he is not a Muslim. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, has informed us that the community will not agree upon misguidance.

I say:

It appears that he meant by this the consensus of the Companions and those who followed them. Alternatively, he meant that such a person is not called a believer for the purposes of legal rulings, and that he is not a Muslim if he denies any of these pillars, or knows that the Messenger conveyed them but does not believe him. Or perhaps he did not count the dissent of those who follow their own inclinations as genuine disagreement. Otherwise, Abū Tālib was certainly familiar with their views. This—and Allah knows best—is what he intended, for he devoted “Chapter Thirty-Three” to explaining Islam and faith in detail and elucidating the convictions underlying the heart’s dealings according to the doctrine of the people of the Community.

What he has said is better than what many others have said, but two points are disputed.

The first is that a Muslim deserving of reward must possess the obligatory faith set out in detail in the hadith of Gabriel.