knowledge, and that He wills and possesses will. All other matters that must be known for knowledge of Allah to be valid are likewise conditions of faith.”

I say:

This is an issue on which al-Ashʿarī expressed two different views: does ignorance of some attributes entail ignorance of the One possessing them, or not? The correct view, held by the majority and representing his later position, is that it does not entail ignorance of the One possessing them. Counting the affirmation of the attributes as part of faith is one respect in which al-Ashʿarī differed from Jahm, for Jahm went to extremes in denying the attributes—indeed, even the names.

Abū al-Hasan said:

“Revelation then stipulated additional conditions: faith must not be accompanied by anything, whether an act or an omission, indicating the disbelief of the person responsible. Thus, religious law commands him to refrain from worshipping and prostrating before an idol; if he does so, this indicates his disbelief. Likewise, if someone kills a prophet or treats him with contempt, this indicates his disbelief. Similarly, failing to honour the written Quran or the Kaʿbah indicates his disbelief.”

He said:

“One of the things we have taken as evidence of his disbelief is that which religious law forbids to accompany faith, or requires to be joined to faith. If it occurs, this indicates to us that the affirmation which constitutes faith is absent from his heart. Likewise, whenever we declare an opponent a disbeliever on account of an interpretation he adopts, we do so only because it indicates that what constitutes faith is absent from his heart. For it is impossible for revelation to declare someone a disbeliever while faith and affirmation remain in his heart.”

The reply is:

There is no doubt that the Lawgiver does not declare someone a disbeliever while faith remains in his heart. But your claim that faith is affirmation, even when entirely devoid of all deeds of the heart, is mistaken.

Hence they said:

“The acts of affirmation and knowledge from his heart—do you not see that religious law has judged him to be a disbeliever, whereas religious law does not judge a believer who affirms the truth to be a disbeliever? Hence we say that the disbelief of Iblīs