Another objection that may be raised against them is this:
If what you have mentioned is correct, it supports the position of the Murjiʾa—indeed, that of the Karrāmiyya—more strongly than it supports your own. For if faith is assent, as you have stated, then assent is a kind of speech. In Arabic usage, the terms “speech,” “utterance,” and the like are applied to meaning together with wording—or, rather, to wording that conveys meaning—more frequently than they are applied to meaning detached from wording.
Indeed, neither “speech” nor any of its forms—such as a statement, affirmation, denial, command, or prohibition—is ever applied to meaning alone, without some accompanying verbal expression, gesture, or something else. Only with a qualification are these terms used in that sense. Since Allah revealed the Quran in the Arabic language, that language recognizes affirmation, denial, and other forms of speech only as meaning together with wording, or wording that conveys meaning. Hence Allah has not regarded anyone as affirming the truthfulness of the messengers merely because of the knowledge and assent within their hearts, unless they also affirm their truthfulness with their tongues.
In Arabic speech, one does not say, “So-and-so affirmed another’s truthfulness,” or “declared him a liar,” merely because he knows in his heart that the other person is truthful or lying, without saying so. Likewise, one does not say, “He commanded him,” or “forbade him,” merely because a request arose in his heart without any accompanying words, gesture, or the like.
When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:
“No ordinary human speech is permissible in this prayer of ours,”
and said:
“Allah introduces such commands as He wills, and among what He has introduced is that you must not speak during prayer,”
the scholars agreed that if someone deliberately speaks during prayer for a purpose that does not serve the prayer, his prayer is invalidated. They also unanimously agreed that the assent present in the heart