when it is qualified; this indicates that its literal meaning is conveyed by his saying:

“Faith has seventy-odd branches.”

As for the hadith of Gabriel, if by faith he meant what he mentioned together with Islam, then that is indeed so. This is certainly the meaning intended by the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Likewise, when he mentioned excellence in worship, he meant excellence together with faith and Islam; he did not mean excellence devoid of faith and Islam. Even supposing that the term “faith” meant mere assent, it was used in that sense only with a contextual indicator, so it would necessarily be figurative. This is self-evident and cannot be disputed after reflection upon the Quran and hadith. This is unlike the claim that “faith” is linguistically synonymous with assent, and the claim that the Lawgiver neither changed its meaning nor transferred it to a new sense, but intended precisely what speakers of the language intended by it, without restriction or qualification. Neither of these two premises can be affirmed with certainty, so they cannot counter what is certain. How could they, when each premise has been shown to be false and among the most unsound assertions?

Furthermore, the term “faith” is no less indicative of the commanded deeds than the terms “prayer,” “fasting,” “zakah,” and “Hajj” are indicative of prayer, fasting, and Hajj as prescribed by Islamic law. This holds whether one says that the Lawgiver transferred the term to a new meaning; intended the ruling rather than the designation; intended the designation but adapted its usage as people do in customary speech; or used the designation in a qualified rather than an unrestricted sense.

If it is said: Prayer, Hajj, and similar acts become invalid if some part of them is omitted, unlike faith,