Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī.

Those who disputed his position said: The disagreement with him is merely terminological. If he concedes that language contains expressions used in a sense other than that for which they were coined, whose meaning is conveyed only through a contextual indication, then this is figurative usage, even if he does not call it that.

Those who defend him reply: Those who divided expressions into literal and figurative usage said: “Literal usage” is the use of an expression in the sense for which it was coined, while “figurative usage” is its use in a sense other than that for which it was coined. Examples are the words “lion” and “donkey,” whether they refer to the animals themselves or, respectively, to a brave man and a dull-witted man. This classification and these definitions entail that an expression was first coined for a particular meaning, after which it may be used either in its assigned sense or in another sense. Hence the well-known position among those who adopt this classification is that every figurative usage must have a corresponding literal usage, whereas not every literal usage has a corresponding figurative usage.

One of their later scholars objected, saying: An expression that has been assigned a meaning but has not yet been used is neither literal nor figurative. If it is then used in a sense other than its assigned meaning, it is a figurative usage with no corresponding literal usage.

All of this would be valid only if it were known that Arabic expressions were first assigned meanings and were subsequently used in those meanings, so that their assignment preceded their use. This, in turn, would be valid only according to the view that languages arise through convention: that a group of rational people gathered and agreed to call one thing by one name and another thing by another name, and that this applies to all languages.

We know of no Muslim who expressed this view before Abū Hāshim ibn al-Jubbā’ī. Both he and Abū al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī studied under Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī. Al-Ash‘arī, however, renounced the Mu‘tazilī school and differed with them concerning divine decree, the threat of punishment, religious designations and rulings, and concerning