because their general scope has been qualified. This is the strongest possible formulation of this objection. Had it not been put to me, I would not have mentioned it, since it has no force.

We reply:

There are several answers. Their logical sequence would call for a particular order, but I shall arrange them differently to make them easier to understand.

First: Even if we supposed it established that women do not see Him on the two occasions mentioned, this would not exclude their seeing Him on other occasions. The specific evidence would thus neither affirm nor deny their seeing Him on other occasions, whereas the general evidence establishes this vision in general terms. No evidence negates their seeing Him on occasions other than these two. The general evidence therefore remains unopposed by the specific evidence and must be acted upon. This is perfectly clear.

If someone says, “I saw a man,” and another says, “You did not see a black man, nor did you see him in Damascus,” the two statements do not contradict one another. When specific evidence does not contradict the corresponding part of a general statement, it cannot be used to qualify that statement. Had there been evidence that women never see Him under any circumstances, this specific evidence would have conflicted with the corresponding part of the general evidence. But if it is said that it indicates seeing Him in a particular setting, how can this be negated by denying vision altogether? And how can negating the particular amount to negating the general?

If it is said, “The people of Paradise see Him only on these two occasions,” we reply, “What evidence establishes this?”

If it is said, “Because the default presumption is that nothing beyond this occurs,” we reply:

Nonoccurrence cannot be invoked as evidence when reporting matters of fact, as all rational people agree. Rather, anyone who asserts it speaks of what he has no knowledge of. If it were asked