in scholarship. Nor did anyone deny it during the first three generations. Its denial arose only after the second century and became widespread after the third. The principal cause of its denial was that some who affirmed the possibility of divine pardon, among both Ahl al-Sunnah and the Murji’ah, found themselves at a loss when those who insist on the fulfilment of divine threats—the Wa'īdiyyah—confronted them with the general wording of the verses and hadiths containing such threats. This drove them to deny generality in language and revelation. In resorting to this denial, they were like someone seeking refuge from scorching ground in a fire.

Had they only found the sound reply to the Wa'īdiyyah—that a threat, though general and unrestricted in one verse, is qualified and restricted in another, in keeping with sound principles; and that it is more appropriate to allow pardon for the person threatened, even if specifically identified, thereby restricting the unrestricted threat—or other such replies! This is not the place to expound upon that, for scholars have established generality through arguments too extensive to mention here.

Indeed, it may be said that the knowledge that generality is conveyed by its linguistic forms is self-evident from language, revelation, and customary usage. Those who deny it are a small group who may deny self-evident truths or be deprived of knowledge of them, just as this has happened to those who deny the knowledge established by mass-transmitted reports and other self-evident matters.

As for someone who concedes that generality is established and has evidentiary force, but says, “Its indication is weak,” or, “Most general expressions are subject to qualification, and no general expression remains unqualified apart from one or a few expressions,” we reply:

First: This objection has no sound basis. The point you have mentioned must either preclude arguing from generality or not preclude it. If it does preclude it,