in that by which they have earned His pleasure and the direct vision of Him. Thus, their seeing Him is established through both direct and converse reasoning. This is a vast subject; unless we bring it to a close, it will have no end.

If it is objected: “The indication afforded by general wording is weak, for it has been said that most general expressions are subject to qualification. It has also been said that there is no general expression except His statement, ‘And He has knowledge of all things.’ Some have even denied altogether that general expressions indicate generality.”

We reply: As for generality established through meaning and reason, no one in the Muslim community has denied its evidentiary force, so far as I know—indeed, no rational person has. Nor can it be denied, unless perhaps someone among the strict literalists, who disregard meanings, adopts the position of denying it. Yet these people do not deny generality of wording; rather, it is their mainstay. Nor do they deny the generality of the meanings conveyed by general expressions. They may, however, deny that the generality of abstract meanings can be understood from another person’s speech.

We therefore know of no one who has denied both kinds of generality: that of wording and that of meaning. We have established generality through both together. There thus remains common ground concerning generality of meaning, which cannot be denied in principle. Whoever denies it closes off his own means of establishing judgments concerning numerous things. Indeed, he deprives his reason of its most distinctive property: making universal judgments. We have established generality on this basis. Scholars have, in fact, differed over whether generality of this kind admits qualification, holding two well-known views.

As for generality of wording, this too has never been denied by any leading scholar or by any group with an established school of thought