and we know from the Lawgiver’s practice that His unqualified address follows the second pattern. By “unqualified,” we exclude qualified expressions such as His words:

“the believing men and believing women.”

Some who hold this view maintain that, in Arabic itself, such wording encompasses both groups when used without qualification.

The second view is that women are included only where there is evidence. Nevertheless, both sides agree that the Quranic verses concerning “legal rulings,” “promises of reward,” and “warnings of punishment” encompass both groups, even when expressed in the masculine form. Some proponents of this view say that both groups are included because revelation uses the wording to refer to both, even though the unqualified expression does not itself encompass them. This amounts to the first view.

Others say that they are included because we know from the religion that both groups are equal with respect to these rulings. Thus, they are included just as we are included in what was addressed to the Messenger, and just as the rest of the Muslim community is included in what was addressed to one of its members, even though the wording itself does not encompass anyone other than the addressee.

The substance of this view is that an expression particular in form is used generally, with a “literal meaning established by convention,” whether that convention is specific or general. Some may call this a manifest analogy that undermines any ruling contrary to it. Most, however, do not call it “analogy.” Rather, the equality of the addressee and others is already known, so we understand an address to him as an address to everyone else. Even if we supposed that the address did not apply to him because of something peculiar to him, this would not entail that it did not apply to others.

“Analogy” involves extending a ruling from one case to another. Here, however, no ruling has been extended; rather, the ruling is established for everyone together. It is more akin to extending the address conveying the ruling, not the ruling itself.