This refutes the position of the “philosophers” who maintain that the celestial sphere is beginningless, such as Aristotle and his followers. “Aristotle” says that it needs the First Cause in order to resemble it. Proclus, Ibn Sīnā, and others like them say that it is His effect—that is, necessitated by Him—and that the First is its efficient cause. Thus, they all say that it depends upon something other than itself, while temporal events subsist in it and it has never been free of them. Yet they say that it is beginningless. This position is false.

“Ibn Sīnā” says that it is contingent, admitting both existence and nonexistence, while temporal events subsist in it, yet that it is eternal and beginningless. This is false. Its dependence upon another precludes its being necessarily existent in itself, for whatever is necessarily existent in itself cannot depend upon another. If it is not necessarily existent in itself, then it is contingent, admitting both existence and nonexistence. In that case, it must have been brought into existence, for several reasons.

One reason is that whatever is contingent and admits both existence and nonexistence can only be something brought into existence. By contrast, that which is beginningless, whose nonexistence is impossible, does not admit both existence and nonexistence.

Another reason is that if, besides being dependent, it has temporal events brought about within it by another, this indicates that the other exercises control and domination over it: temporal events are brought about within it, and it cannot ward them off. Whatever stands in such subjection in relation to another neither exists through itself nor is self-sufficient; nor is it unassailable or independent in itself. Anything of this kind can only be something made and subject to a Lord, and must therefore have been brought into existence.

Furthermore, if it is never free of the temporal events that another brings about within it, and did not precede them, but rather they have always accompanied it, this indicates that throughout its existence it stands in subjection in relation to another and is under its control; this indicates