And if we proceed on that basis, the expression “temporal occurrences” is ambiguous. It may mean that no genus subsists in Him containing a kind of which no instance had previously existed. Or it may mean that neither any kind nor any individual instance of temporal occurrences subsists in Him. If the latter is intended, the early generations, the leading authorities of the Sunnah and hadith, and many groups of speculative theologians hold the contrary view.

If the “former” is intended, the dispute is with the “Karrāmiyyah” and those like them—those who say that attributes arose in His essence which had not existed before: He began speaking by His will after not having done so, and began willing action after not having done so. The speech and will which the Muʿtazilah say come into being apart from Him, these people say come into being within His essence. The “Kullābiyyah” say that these are eternal and exist without His will and power, whereas these others say that they have a temporal beginning as a kind and arise through His power and His eternal will. According to them, His eternal will, together with His power, necessitated what subsists in His essence.

These people therefore say that He brought speech as a kind into being within His essence, having had no speech before that. This is not the position of the early generations. Rather, their position is that He has always been speaking.

It is thus clear that His creating speech within His essence is absolutely impossible: first, because nothing created can subsist in His essence; and second, because it would entail that He began speaking after not having done so. This is distinct from their assertion that temporal occurrences do not subsist in Him.

There are therefore “three approaches” here to refuting this view: the approach of the Kullābiyyah, the approach of the Karrāmiyyah, and the approach of the early generations. This is why this possibility was among those mentioned by Abd al-Azīz ibn Yahyā