As for the third possibility, if He created it as something self-subsisting, that would be impossible, because it is an attribute, and an attribute cannot subsist by itself. This is self-evident.

It has been reported that some of the Muʿtazilah hold that He creates ropes in a subject. The Basrans—who are more eminent and superior to the Baghdadis—say that He creates a will without a subject. They may thus contradict this argument.

As for the first possibility—that if He created it within Himself, He would be a subject in which temporal occurrences inhere—the precise formulation is this: if He created it within Himself, He would be a subject in which something created inheres, whereas He cannot be such a subject.

If they say, “We call everything that comes into being created,” this is precisely a point of dispute. The early generations, the leading scholars of hadith, and many schools of speculative theology—such as the Hishāmiyyah, the Karrāmiyyah, Abū Muʿādh al-Tūmanī and others—do not say that everything that comes into being is created. Rather, they say that temporal occurrences fall into two categories: those that inhere in His Essence through His power and will, including His creation of created things; and those that exist distinct from Him. It is the latter that are created, because anything created necessarily requires an act of creation. The act of creation that inheres in His Essence, however, does not require another act of creation; rather, it occurs solely through His power and will.

In the Quran, power relates to this act, not to the thing produced considered apart from the act, as in His words:

“Is He not able to give life to the dead?”

And His words:

“Say: He is able to send punishment upon you from above you or from beneath your feet.”

And His words:

“Yes indeed, We are able to fashion his very fingertips.”

And His words:

“Is not He who created the heavens and the earth able to create the like of them?”