such as the analogy of those who said, “Trade is only like usury,” the analogy of Iblīs, and other such false analogies concerning which some of the early generations said:
“The first to reason by analogy was Iblīs, and the sun and moon were worshipped only through analogies.”
They meant the analogical reasoning of those who oppose revealed texts and those who draw false analogies. Any analogy that contradicts a revealed text can only be false. Sound analogical reasoning, however, belongs to the balance that Allah has sent down. It never contradicts a revealed text; rather, it agrees with it.
This also makes clear that whatever sound rational proofs the philosophers possess support the position of the early generations as well. Their principal argument for “the beginninglessness of the world” rests on the claims that the Lord has always acted; that He cannot begin acting after not having acted; that action cannot become possible for Him after having been impossible; and that He cannot become capable after having been incapable. This argument, and everything else they have adduced, establishes only the beginninglessness of action as a kind. It does not establish that anything in the world has no beginning, whether a celestial sphere or anything else.
Thus, if it is said that He has always acted by His will and power, and that action necessarily accompanies life—as some of the imams of the Sunnah have stated—this affirms what all their sound rational proofs entail. It also agrees with the statement of the early generations:
“He has always spoken whenever He wills.”
He has therefore always spoken whenever He wills and acted as He wills. Everything that the Kullābiyyah, the Ashʿariyyah, the Sālimiyyah and others have adduced to establish the beginninglessness of speech proves only that He has always spoken whenever He wills. It does not establish the beginninglessness of speech independent of His will, nor that any particular speech has no beginning. Rather, it establishes the beginninglessness of speech as a kind.