Majmu' al-Fatawa - Ibn Taimiya - (6/293)

Majmu' al-FatawaIbn Taimiya

silent or mute, just as it would be deaf if it could not hear, and blind if it could not see; and because His essence is capable of speech, and whatever is capable of something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite). This is how they argue for it.

This has been disputed, and rational thinkers have disagreed with them, including their own later followers, such as al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī. Those earlier thinkers claimed that, since a body is capable of bearing accidents, it must possess at least one accident of each kind. They said that air has taste, colour, and smell, but the majority disagreed with them.

The “argument,” however, can be formulated as follows: if the Lord Most High is capable of possessing an attribute, He cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite. Alternatively, one may say: if He is capable of possessing an attribute of perfection, He must possess it. For whatever the Lord is capable of possessing does not depend on anything other than Him for its existence in Him. Nothing other than Him makes Him either possess attributes or act. Rather, His essence alone necessitates whatever He is capable of possessing. Since His essence necessitates whatever He is capable of possessing, and His essence necessarily exists, whatever He can possess must necessarily exist in Him.

If it is supposed that He is capable of possessing either of two opposites, He cannot be without one of them. For if He were without either, the existence of one of them in Him would depend upon a cause other than His essence. The supposition is that He is capable of possessing it and that its existence in Him is possible. It is already known that this does not depend on anything other than Him; and if He did not bring it into existence and His essence did not necessitate it, its existence would otherwise be impossible. For nothing other than Him can cause it to exist in Him. If it comes into existence neither through Himself nor through anything else, it is impossible, whereas the supposition is that it is possible. Thus, whatever is possible for Him is necessary for Him.

سَاكِتًا أَوْ أَخْرَسَ كَمَا أَنَّهُ إذَا لَمْ يَكُنْ سَمِيعًا كَانَ أَصَمَّ وَإِذَا لَمْ يَكُنْ بَصِيرًا كَانَ أَعْمَى وَلِأَنَّ ذَاتَه قَابِلَةٌ لِلْكَلَامِ وَالْقَابِلُ لِلشَّيْءِ لَا يَخْلُو عَنْهُ وَعَنْ ضِدِّهِ هَكَذَا يَحْتَجُّونَ لَهُ. وَقَدْ نُوزِعُوا فِي ذَلِكَ وَخَالَفَهُمْ الْعُقَلَاءُ حَتَّى أَصْحَابُهُمْ الْمُتَأَخِّرُونَ: مِثْلُ الرَّازِي والآمدي؛ فَإِنَّ أُولَئِكَ ادَّعَوْا أَنَّ الْجِسْمَ لَمَّا كَانَ قَابِلًا لِلْأَعْرَاضِ لَمْ يَخْلُ مِنْ كُلِّ نَوْعٍ مِنْ أَنْوَاعِ الْأَعْرَاضِ مِنْ بَعْضِهَا وَقَالُوا: إنَّ الْهَوَاءَ لَهُ طَعْمٌ وَلَوْنٌ وَرِيحٌ فَخَالَفَهُمْ الْجُمْهُورُ. لَكِنْ تَقْرِيرُ " الْحُجَّةِ " بِأَنْ يُقَالَ: لِأَنَّ الرَّبَّ تَعَالَى إذَا كَانَ قَابِلًا لِلِاتِّصَافِ بِشَيْءِ لَمْ يَخْلُ مِنْهُ؛ أَوْ مِنْ ضِدِّهِ. أَوْ يُقَالَ: بِأَنَّهُ إذَا كَانَ قَابِلًا لِلِاتِّصَافِ بِصِفَةِ كَمَالٍ لَزِمَ وُجُودُهَا لَهُ؛ لِأَنَّ مَا كَانَ الرَّبُّ قَابِلًا لَهُ لَمْ يَتَوَقَّفْ وُجُودُهُ لَهُ عَلَى غَيْرِهِ؛ فَإِنَّ غَيْرَهُ لَا يَجْعَلُهُ لَا مُتَّصِفًا وَلَا فَاعِلًا؛ بَلْ ذَاتُهُ وَحْدَهَا هِيَ الْمُوجِبَةُ لِمَا كَانَ قَابِلًا لَهُ وَإِذَا كَانَتْ ذَاتُهُ هِيَ الْمُوجِبَةُ لِمَا هُوَ قَابِلٌ لَهُ وَذَاتُهُ وَاجِبَةُ الْوُجُودِ كَانَ الْمَقْبُولُ وَاجِبَ الْوُجُودِ لَهُ وَهُوَ إذَا قَدَّرَ أَنَّهُ قَابِلٌ لِلضِّدَّيْنِ لَمْ يَخْلُ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا؛ لِأَنَّهُ لَوْ خَلَا مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا لَكَانَ وُجُودُ أَحَدِهِمَا لَهُ مُتَوَقِّفًا عَلَى سَبَبٍ غَيْرِ ذَاتِهِ؛ فَإِنَّ التَّقْدِيرَ أَنَّهُ قَابِلٌ لَهُ وَوُجُودُ الْمَقْبُولِ لَهُ مُمْكِنٌ وَقَدْ عُرِفَ أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَوَقَّفُ عَلَى غَيْرِهِ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مُوجِدًا لَهُ وَلَمْ تَكُنْ ذَاتُهُ مُوجِبَةً لَهُ وَإِلَّا امْتَنَعَ وَجُودُهُ؛ فَإِنَّ غَيْرَهُ لَا يَجْعَلُهُ مَوْجُودًا لَهُ وَإِذَا لَمْ يُوجَدْ - لَا بِنَفْسِهِ وَلَا بِغَيْرِهِ - كَانَ مُمْتَنِعًا وَالتَّقْدِيرُ أَنَّهُ مُمْكِنٌ؛ فَمَا كَانَ مُمْكِنًا لَهُ كَانَ وَاجِبًا لَهُ.