setting; it may set without undergoing change, move without undergoing change, or move without setting.
This holds even if change is narrower in scope than motion according to one of the two terminological usages. For “motion” may mean spatial motion, which does not necessarily entail change. It may also have a broader meaning, encompassing motion in quality and quantity, such as a plant’s motion through growth, or the motions of the human soul through love, contentment, anger, and remembrance. Such motion may be described as change, while in some contexts “change” may mean transformation.
In short, if an argument employing the term “change” is based on revelation, setting is not change. If it is a rational argument, and “change”—which is held to be impossible for the Lord—means the very matter under dispute, it cannot serve as evidence. If it means matters on which there is consensus, there is no dispute concerning them.
Still more unsound is the claim that setting means contingency, as Ibn Sīnā said: “Descending into the realm of contingency is, in a certain respect, a setting.” This would entail that everything other than Allah is setting and perpetually remains so, since everything other than Him is contingent and perpetually remains contingent. Setting would thus be an inseparable attribute of everything other than Allah, just as being contingent and dependent upon Allah is an inseparable attribute of it.
On this account, the sun, moon, and stars would always have been, and would forever remain, setting