Majmu' al-Fatawa - Ibn Taimiya - (6/282)

Majmu' al-FatawaIbn Taimiya

all contrary acts, then being forbidden to perform some of them would not necessarily mean that he was commanded to perform any of the others, since he could refrain from that act without performing any of its contraries. Since, however, they regard him as commanded to perform some of them, it follows that whoever is capable of either of two contrary acts cannot be devoid of both. Accordingly, if the Lord has always possessed power, He must always have been performing some act or its opposite. This entails that He has always been acting. If it is possible that He has always been bringing about temporally originated events, it is also possible that He has always been receptive to them. This response can also be presented in a form that leaves no room for dispute.

(The fourteenth response:

It may be said: If whatever is receptive to something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite, then whoever is capable of something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite, since whoever possesses power is receptive to performing the act within his power. If receptivity to temporally originated events entails the possibility of their existence from eternity, then eternal power to bring about temporally originated events likewise entails the possibility of their existence from eternity. If it is possible to possess power while its object is impossible, it is also possible to be receptive while the object of that receptivity is impossible.

If it is said, “His receptivity to them is inseparable from His essence,” the reply is: “His power over them is inseparable from His essence.” Accordingly, if the perpetual occurrence of temporally originated events is possible, it is possible that He has always possessed power over them and been receptive to them. If their perpetual occurrence is not possible, then His receptivity to them and His power over them have become possible after not having been so. If this is admissible in one case, it is admissible in the other; if it is impossible in one, it is impossible in the other. Thus, “this question” comes back to the very possibility of exercising power to bring about temporally originated events perpetually, which is “

جَمِيعِ الْأَضْدَادِ لَكَانَ إذَا نَهَى عَنْ بَعْضِ الْأَضْدَادِ لَمْ يَجِبْ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَأْمُورًا بِشَيْءِ مِنْهَا؛ لِإِمْكَانِ أَنْ لَا يَفْعَلَ ذَلِكَ الضِّدَّ وَلَا غَيْرَهُ مِنْ الْأَضْدَادِ. فَلَمَّا جَعَلُوهُ مَأْمُورًا بِبَعْضِهَا: عُلِمَ أَنَّ الْقَادِرَ عَلَى أَحَدِ الضِّدَّيْنِ لَا يَخْلُو مِنْهُ وَمِنْ ضِدِّهِ وَحِينَئِذٍ فَإِذَا كَانَ الرَّبُّ لَمْ يَزَلْ قَادِرًا: لَزِمَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ فَاعِلًا لِشَيْءِ أَوْ لِضِدِّهِ؛ فَيَلْزَمُ مِنْ ذَلِكَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ فَاعِلًا وَإِذَا أَمْكَنَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ فَاعِلًا لِلْحَوَادِثِ أَمْكَنَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ قَابِلًا لَهَا. وَيُمْكِنُ أَنْ يُذْكَرَ هَذَا الْجَوَابُ عَلَى وَجْهٍ لَا يَقْبَلُ النِّزَاعَ. (الْوَجْهُ الرَّابِعَ عَشَرَ: فَيُقَالُ: إنْ كَانَ الْقَابِلُ لِلشَّيْءِ لَا يَخْلُو عَنْهُ وَعَنْ ضِدِّهِ فَالْقَادِرُ عَلَى الشَّيْءِ لَا يَخْلُو عَنْهُ وَعَنْ ضِدِّهِ؛ لِأَنَّ الْقَادِرَ قَابِلٌ لِفِعْلِ الْمَقْدُورِ وَإِنْ كَانَ قَبُولُ الْقَابِلِ لِلْحَوَادِثِ يَسْتَلْزِمُ إمْكَانَ وُجُودِهَا فِي الْأَزَلِ فَقُدْرَةُ الْقَادِرِ أَزَلِيَّةٌ عَلَى فِعْلِ الْحَوَادِثِ يَسْتَلْزِمُ إمْكَانَ وُجُودِهَا فِي الْأَزَلِ؛ وَإِنْ أَمْكَنَ أَنْ يَكُونَ قَادِرًا مَعَ امْتِنَاعِ الْمَقْدُورِ: أَمْكَنَ أَنْ يَكُونَ قَابِلًا مَعَ امْتِنَاعِ الْمَقْبُولِ. وَإِنْ قِيلَ: قَبُولُهُ لَهَا مِنْ لَوَازِمِ ذَاتِهِ: قِيلَ قُدْرَتُهُ عَلَيْهَا مِنْ لَوَازِمِ ذَاتِهِ. وَحِينَئِذٍ: فَإِنْ كَانَ دَوَامُ الْحَوَادِثِ مُمْكِنًا: أَمْكَنَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ قَادِرًا عَلَيْهَا قَابِلًا لَهَا؛ وَإِنْ كَانَ دَوَامُهَا لَيْسَ بِمُمْكِنِ: فَقَدْ صَارَ قَبُولُهُ لَهَا وَقُدْرَتُهُ عَلَيْهَا مُمْكِنًا بَعْدَ أَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ. فَإِنْ كَانَ هَذَا جَائِزًا جَازَ هَذَا وَإِنْ كَانَ هَذَا مُمْتَنِعًا كَانَ هَذَا مُمْتَنِعًا وَعَادَ الْأَمْرُ فِي " هَذِهِ الْمَسْأَلَةِ " إلَى نَفْسِ الْقُدْرَةِ عَلَى دَوَامِ الْحَوَادِثِ وَهُوَ "