Some say that its effect may—or must—be temporally separated from it. Thus, the object of power can only come after the one possessing power with an intervening delay, and likewise the effect after its cause. This is the view of many speculative theologians and others.

Others say that, rather, its effect may—or must—coexist with it in time. This is maintained by those philosophers who hold this view, and some speculative theologians have agreed with them regarding the efficient cause, saying that its effect coexists with it in time.

The third view is that the effect follows immediately upon the complete cause, neither separated from it by an interval nor simultaneous with it. Thus, the one possessing power must precede the existence of the object of his power, without an intervening gap.

If someone says, “The existence of the one possessing power must precede the existence of the object of his power,” they reply: “If by precedence you mean separation by an interval, that is not conceded. If you mean the absence of simultaneity, that is conceded. But we do not concede simultaneity.”

This becomes clear through the ninth response, which is as follows: You have offered no evidence for your statement, “As for the necessary existence of the receptive subject, it need not precede the existence of what it receives.” This is a universal negative proposition, and it is disputed.

Rather, what is received may be one of the inseparable attributes, such as life, knowledge, and power. In that case, what is received must coexist with the receptive subject, so the receptive subject does not precede what it receives. Alternatively, it may be one of the voluntary matters that come into being through the Lord’s power and will. These things received are objects of the Lord’s power, and, although received, they are a type of