valid to say of a sword that cuts, “It has no cutting power,” nor of plentiful bread, “It does not satisfy hunger,” or plentiful water, “It does not quench thirst.” Thus, these descriptions are known to be literal. This is al-Qādī’s reasoning.

I say:

This is because such a description rests upon the perfection of the quality from which the act proceeds, not upon the actual performance of the act. Accordingly, He is described in terms of everything He has the power to do, even if He does not do it.

I say:

Our fellow scholars have differed over Ahmad’s statement:

“Allah has always been Knowing, Speaking, and All-Forgiving.”

Is his statement that He has always been Speaking like his statement that He has always been All-Forgiving, or like his statement that He has always been Knowing? There are two views.

(The second approach:

The act is certain to proceed from Him in time to come, just as we are now certain, before the resurrection and the inheritance, that He is the Resurrector and the Inheritor. This is the approach of Abū Ishāq ibn Shāqilā and also of al-Qādī. This differs from the case of someone who may or may not perform the act. In some respects, it resembles describing the Prophet, before his prophethood, as the Seal of the Prophets, the foremost of Adam’s descendants, and the Seal of the Messengers; or describing Umar as the conqueror of the cities. Similarly, it was said, “The prophet of this community was born tonight,” and he said:

“Follow the two who come after me: Abū Bakr and Umar.”

A group of scholars of legal theory have stated that applying an attribute before the quality it signifies exists is figurative by agreement; applying it while that quality exists is literal; and applying it after that quality has existed and ceased to exist is disputed. However, the majority reject this claim of agreement, distinguishing between someone whose performance of the act is certain and someone whose performance of it is merely possible.