became capable after having been incapable. This is precisely what change means, even though no cause arose that would make Him capable.

If they say, “In pre-eternity, He had power over all that would ever be,” the reply is: This combines negation and affirmation. He was, then, capable in pre-eternity. Was speaking possible for Him, or was it impossible?

If you say, “It was possible for Him,” then you have admitted the possibility that He has always been acting and that He has power over an endless succession of events.

If you say, “Rather, it was impossible,” the reply is: No one endowed with power can have power over an act that remains impossible rather than possible. Power extends only to what is possible, not to what is impossible.

If you say, “It became possible for Him thereafter,” then you have said that it became possible for Him to act after it had been impossible for Him to act. This explicitly means that He became capable after having been incapable, and this explicitly entails change.

Thus, the claim of these negators—that those who affirm the attributes must maintain that He undergoes “change”—has been shown to be false. Rather, it is they whose position entails that He changes.

(The fourth argument:

They say: For temporal events to inhere in Him constitutes “setting.” Abraham, the intimate friend of Allah, said:

“I do not love those that set.”

And “that which sets” is that which moves and in which temporal events occur. Thus, Abraham denied love for anyone in whom temporal events occur; such a being, therefore, cannot be God.

If the disputant says, “By His having changed, I mean that He spoke by His will and power, that He loves obedience from us, rejoices in the repentance of the repentant, and comes on the Day of Resurrection,” the reply is: Even granting that you call this change, why do you say that it is impossible? This is precisely the point at issue. As al-Rāzī said: “The antecedent is the second.”