and if it is impossible, then the existence of infinitely many temporal events is impossible. In that case, they would not be possible in beginningless eternity—neither objects of power nor capable of being received. Yet their impossibility thereafter does not follow. Temporal events do exist, so their perpetual impossibility cannot be maintained. This exhaustive division demonstrates the invalidity of “this argument.”

The second ground is as follows: There is no doubt that the Lord, Exalted is He, possesses power. Either He has always possessed power—which is correct—or He acquired power after having lacked it. If it is said that He has always possessed power, the response is: If He has always possessed power, and the object of His power has always been possible, then the perpetual existence of possible things would be possible, and thus so would the perpetual occurrence of temporal events. In that case, His being receptive to them in beginningless eternity would not be impossible.

If it is said, “Rather, action was impossible and then became possible,” the response is: This combines two contradictories, for one who possesses power cannot have power over something impossible. How, then, could He possess power while the object of His power is impossible? Furthermore, even supposing this were possible, it could be said that in beginningless eternity He has power over whatever can occur in the endless future. The same applies to what can be received: it could be said that in beginningless eternity He is receptive to whatever can occur in the endless future.

The third ground: If He is said to be receptive to something in beginningless eternity, He is receptive only to that over which He has power and whose existence is possible. As for what is impossible and falls outside the scope of power, He is not receptive to it.

The fourth ground is as follows: He has the power to bring into existence created things distinct from Himself. It is known that one who possesses power has, with greater reason, power over his own action subsisting in him than over something distinct from him; and if