cannot be beginningless, and the absence of what is impossible is not an imperfection; for imperfection is the absence of an attribute of perfection that is possible.

Fourth: This objection applies to everything the Lord has done and created. It may be said: If His creating this is an imperfection, then He has been characterized by imperfection; and if it is a perfection, then He previously lacked it. If you say, “In our view, the ‘attributes of action’ are neither imperfections nor perfections,” the response is: If you say that, your opponent can likewise say that these occurrences in time are neither imperfections nor perfections.

Fifth: It may be said: If sound reason is presented with a being capable of speaking by its own power and itself doing whatever it wills, and another being incapable of speaking by its will or acting itself in any way—being instead like an incapacitated person in whom no act can occur by his own choice—sound reason judges the former being to be more perfect. Thus, it is you who have attributed imperfection to the Lord. Perfection lies in His possessing these attributes, not in denying that He possesses them.

Sixth: It may be said: Concerning occurrences in time, none of which can be beginningless and which can only come into existence successively, suppose one asks: Which is more perfect—to have the power to bring them about successively, or to lack that power? Sound reason clearly recognizes that one who can bring them about successively is more perfect than one who cannot.

Yet you say that the Lord has no power over any of these things, while also saying that He has power over things separate from Him. It is well known that an agent’s power to perform an act inherent in himself is prior to his power over things separate from him. Thus, if you say