that selection. Furthermore, when what is willed comes into existence, there must be a cause necessitating its occurrence. Otherwise, if the previously existing will and power alone were sufficient, it would necessarily have existed earlier, for complete will together with complete power necessarily entails the existence of the object of that power.

Those who maintain that creation is identical to the created thing—such as Abū al-Hasan and his followers, including Ibn ʿAqīl—have argued as follows: If creation were distinct from the created thing, it would have to be either eternal or originated. If it were eternal, the created thing would necessarily be eternal, since the two are correlatives. If it were originated, this would entail that originated events subsist in Him. That created thing would then require another act of creation, entailing an infinite regress.

The majority answered them, each group proceeding according to its own principles. One group said: Creation is eternal, even though the created thing is originated. Many adherents of the four schools hold this view, as do most Hanafīs. They said: You concede that will is eternal and beginningless, while what is willed is originated. We therefore say concerning creation what you say concerning will.

Another group said: Rather, the act of creation occurs within His essence and does not require another act of creation; instead, it occurs through His power. You yourselves say that the created thing comes into existence through His power after not having existed. If something separate from Him can come into existence through His power alone, then this applies all the more to what is inherent in Him. This is the answer given by many of the Karrāmiyyah, the Hishāmiyyah and others.

Another group says: Suppose it does require an act preceding it. Why do you say that this is impossible? As for your assertion, “This is an infinite regress,” the reply is: This is not an infinite regress of agents and causes