receptive to that attribute, which would entail an impossible infinite regress.

We have discussed most of what they have advanced on this subject at length, demonstrating its invalidity and inconsistency in a manner that leaves no doubt for anyone who understands the subject. Their leading scholars—the later figures, such as al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, al-Tūsī, al-Hillī and others—acknowledge that they have no rational proof for denying this. Indeed, al-Rāzī and his followers stated that this position follows necessarily from the views of all the schools, and he defended it in his later works, such as “al-Matālib al-ʿĀliyah” (The Lofty Inquiries)—one of his largest works on speculative theology, which he entitled “Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl fī Dirāyat al-Usūl” (The Utmost Reach of Reason in Understanding the Fundamentals).

Once he recognized the invalidity of the position of those who deny the attributes, he did not rely on that argument in “the question of the Quran.” For their principal argument in “the question of the Quran,” when they say, “He did not speak by His will and power,” is: “Because that would entail the inherence of temporal events.” Once he recognized the invalidity of this premise, he did not rely on it in “the question of the Quran,” although it is their principal support. Instead, he argued from a composite consensus—an exceedingly weak proof—because he had nothing else with which to defend the Kullābiyyah’s position. This is among the things that show that he and others like him had come to recognize the invalidity of their position.

Likewise, “al-Āmidī” presented in “Abkār al-Afkār” (The First Fruits of Thought) an argument that invalidates their position, and stated that there was no answer to it. I have clarified these matters elsewhere. This is widely known among scholars; even al-Hillī ibn al-Mutahhar stated in his books that there is no proof for denying “the inherence of temporal events.” Thus, anyone who disputes this is ignorant of both reason and revelation.