must be understood with that qualification; for if we supposed the act to have existed from eternity, this would entail the eternity of the world. Speech, however, is like knowledge.”

The judge said at the beginning of the discussion:

“Ahmad’s statement, ‘He has always been forgiving,’ establishes that all the attributes are eternal, whether they are derived from an act, such as forgiveness, creation and provision, or are not so derived. His statement, ‘He has always been speaking whenever He wills,’ means: whenever He wills to make it heard.”

I say: This approach of the judge is also that of his followers, their followers and others, such as Ibn ‘Aqīl and Ibn al-Zāghūnī. Most hadith scholars among Ahmad’s followers and others, as well as many speculative theologians, disagree with him on this matter. Regarding the act, they hold one of two views:

The first—which is the judge’s other view and the one regarded as correct by our scholars—is that the act is eternal, while what it produces is created. This is just as we concede to them regarding the will and the word that brings things into being: the will is eternal, while what is willed comes into being. Likewise, the opposing disputant says: “Bringing into being is eternal, whereas what is brought into being is created.”

(The second is that, in their view, the act itself and speech are both uncreated, even though they occur at one time and not at another; for they subsist in Allah, whereas whatever is created must be separate from Allah.

They say that Ahmad’s statement agrees with what we have said, for he said: “He has always been speaking whenever He wills.”