, while others say that the act of creation is distinct from the created thing]. (*) The act of creation is an attribute subsisting in His essence, whereas the created thing is the entity brought into existence. This is based on our principle that He is described from pre-eternity by the attributes arising from acts, even though the things brought about by those acts originate in time. He said: This is the correct view.

Regarding rising over, descending, coming, and other kinds of acts that fall within the general category of motion, they adopt one of two views. Either they regard these as mere “relations” and “relational ascriptions,” meaning that Allah created the Throne as something below Him and thereby became established over it; that He removes the veils between Himself and His creation and thereby comes to them; and other such explanations. They likewise hold that speaking consists only in making the addressee hear. This is the view held by the adherents of this position who belong to Ahl al-Sunnah among the Hanbalīs, and by the Ashʿarīs and others who agree with them on all or part of it.

Alternatively, they say that these are “mere acts” occurring in created things, without any relational ascription or relation. Their disagreement, then, concerns whether these relations and relational ascriptions are affirmed for Allah, despite the general agreement that “relations” and “relational ascriptions” involving Allah Most High must arise in time, such as His being with His creation and the like.

Ibn ʿAqīl calls these relations “states” of Allah. These are not the “states” disputed by the theologians, such as being knowing and being powerful; rather, it is these relations and relational ascriptions that he calls states. He says that the arising of these states is not the arising of attributes, for these states are relations between Allah and creation, and this does not entail the existence of a reality subsisting