the Hanbalīs and those jurists, Sufis, and others who follow them—is that this category must be assigned to one of the two preceding categories. It must therefore be either pre-eternal and subsisting in Him, according to those who allow this, namely the Kullābiyyah, or created and separate from Him. It is impossible, they maintain, for any attribute, state, act, or anything that is not pre-eternal to subsist in Him.

They call this question “the question of temporal events indwelling in His essence.” They say that temporal events cannot indwell in His essence. Others call this “the essence acting by itself or within itself.” They held that allowing this would entail His having a beginning, because the proof by which they established that bodies have a beginning was the subsistence of temporal events in them. Thus, if such events subsisted in Him, one of two consequences would follow: either He would have a beginning, or knowledge that the world has a beginning would be invalidated.

Those who disagree with them on this say: The proof that the world has a beginning is that it cannot be free of temporal events and does not precede them. If, however, it could precede them, their subsistence in it would not indicate that it has a beginning.

Others say: This is not the proof that the world has a beginning; rather, it is a weak argument. They have other lines of reasoning.

They in turn fall into two groups. The first consists of those who also hold that attributes cannot subsist in Him, because they believe that attributes are accidents and that an accident subsisting in Him would likewise entail His having a beginning. These are the deniers of the attributes among