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As for the assertion:

“If acts subsisted in Him, He would be a locus of temporally originated events. If a temporally originated event entailed a perfection for Him, He would have lacked that perfection before it occurred, which is a deficiency. If it did not entail a perfection for Him, it would not be permissible to attribute it to Him.”

The first response is that this argument is countered by its counterpart concerning the temporally originated events He brings about. Both come into being through His power and will; they differ only in their locus. This same dilemma applies in both cases.

If the distinction proposed is, “The effect produced is not an attribute of Him, unlike an act subsisting in Him,” the answer is: Rather, they do ascribe attributes of action to Him, dividing attributes into intrinsic attributes and attributes of action. Thus, they describe Him as Creator and Provider after He had not been so. This dilemma therefore applies to them. Indeed, the philosophers raised it against them concerning “the temporal origination of the world,” whereupon they claimed that attributes of action are attributes of neither perfection nor deficiency.

They may therefore be given the same answer that they gave these others: the “acts” that subsist in Him are neither a perfection nor a deficiency.

If it is said, “He must be characterized by either deficiency or perfection,” the reply is: “He must be characterized, in respect of