with composition as a condition, or to two atoms, or to four, six, eight, sixteen, or thirty-two atoms, or to a composite of matter and form.

Others say that it means whatever exists, or whatever subsists in itself. In general, adherents of both views regard “what can be pointed to” as coextensive with “body.” Since the term has come to convey meanings, some true and others false, it has become ambiguous.

The scholarly response, then, is to ask: “When you say that they are accidents, do you mean that they subsist in the Essence, or are attributes of the Essence, or some other sound meaning of this kind? Or do you mean that they are defects and imperfections? Or do you mean that they arise and cease, and do not persist for two moments?”

If you mean the first, that is correct. If you mean the second, that is not accepted. If you mean the third, this rests on the view of those who say that an accident does not persist for two moments. Whoever holds this view while maintaining that the attributes endure says, “I do not call them accidents.” But whoever says that an accident does persist for two moments would not find this an impediment to calling them accidents.

As for your statement, “An accident can subsist only in a body,” the response is: “According to you, He is Living, All-Knowing, All-Powerful. Yet these names are applied only to a body, just as these attributes, which you have classified as accidents, are ascribed only to a body. Whatever answer you give concerning the affirmation of the names serves equally as an answer for those who affirm the attributes concerning their affirmation of them.”

He is also asked: “What do you mean when you say, ‘These attributes are accidents that can subsist only in a body’? Do you mean