One is to say:

It has been established that Allah is beginningless in Himself, necessarily existent in Himself, self-subsisting, and a Creator in His own right, among His other distinctive attributes. The familiar argument establishing necessary existence applies to all these meanings.

Thus, to say, “Existence is either necessary or contingent, and contingent existence requires necessary existence; therefore, necessary existence is established in either case,” is like saying: A being is either beginningless or originated, and an originated being requires a beginningless being; therefore, a beginningless being is established in either case. A being is either self-sufficient or dependent, and a dependent being requires a self-sufficient being; therefore, a self-sufficient being exists in either case. A being is either self-subsisting or not self-subsisting, and whatever is not self-subsisting requires one that is; therefore, a self-subsisting being is established in either case. A being is either created or uncreated, and a created being requires an uncreated Creator; therefore, an uncreated Creator is established in either case. There are many similar arguments.

It is then said:

Either this necessary, beginningless Creator can possess the perfection, free of deficiency, that a contingent being can possess, or He cannot. The latter is impossible, because such perfection is possible for an originated, dependent, contingent being. It must therefore be all the more possible for the necessary, self-sufficient, beginningless Being, since both exist. What is under discussion is perfection whose existence is possible and which involves no deficiency. If such perfection is possible for the lesser being, it must be all the more possible for the greater. For whatever is possible for that which is deficient in its existence must be possible for that which is