but not another; and that a scholar may make two correct statements, addressing each to a different group because that is what benefits them. Both statements are sound and do not contradict one another, yet stating them together may harm both groups. He therefore presents them together only to those whom this will not harm.

Since these matters may be definitive or open to scholarly judgment, the same grounds that allow scholarly judgment in matters of practice allow it here. Much of Quranic commentary, or even most of it, falls into this category: many disagreements in Quranic commentary concern questions of knowledge and what is reported, rather than questions of practice. Yet personal desires may intrude into major questions just as they may intrude into practical matters.

One proponent may condemn another’s position so strongly that he declares him a disbeliever or a sinful innovator deserving to be shunned, even though he does not deserve this. This, too, is an exercise of scholarly judgment. Such severity may be justified with certain individuals or in certain circumstances, because of the manifest clarity of the Sunnah whose contravention constitutes disbelief, and because of the harm inherent in the opposing view, on account of which its proponent is deemed an innovator. These are matters that a discerning person should understand.

For when a true statement is uttered, its necessary, intrinsic characteristic is that it corresponds to the reality reported. But whether the hearer knows it, considers it probable, or is ignorant of it; whether it is certain or conjectural for him; whether accepting it is obligatory or forbidden; and whether the person who denies it becomes a disbeliever or does not—these are practical rulings that vary according to individuals and circumstances.