attributing corporeality to Him, so does the other; and if it does not entail attributing corporeality to Him, neither does the other. To claim a distinction between them on the grounds that one entails likening Him to creation or attributing corporeality to Him while the other does not is to distinguish between like things and combine contradictions. For what he denies in one, he affirms in the other, and what he affirms in one, he denies in the other. Thus he combines contradictions.”
For this reason, scholars of thorough understanding have said:
“Whoever denies any of the names and attributes established by the Quran and Sunnah inevitably contradicts himself. The very argument he uses to deny what he denies applies equally to what he affirms. If the rational argument for denial is valid, all must be denied; if it is not, none of them need be denied. Affirming something while denying its like is an invalid contradiction.”
If the Mu‘tazilī says:
“The attributes imply corporeality, because attributes are accidents that can subsist only in a body. This is why I interpret the texts concerning the attributes figuratively, but not those concerning the names.”
He is told:
“The same consequence follows for you regarding the names. The very argument by which you infer that one possessing life, knowledge, and power can only be a body is used by your opponent to infer that the All-Knowing, the All-Powerful, the Ever-Living can only be a body.”
You are therefore told:
“Affirming One who is living, knowing, and powerful must either entail attributing corporeality to Him or not. If it does, you must affirm that He is a body; thus He would not be bounded with respect to being seen, on either supposition. If it does not, it may equally be said that affirming knowledge, power, and will does not entail attributing corporeality to Him. If the one does not entail it, neither does the other; and if the one entails it, so does the other. There is therefore no distinction between them. To distinguish between them is a manifest contradiction.”
If the Jahmī, the Qarmatī, and the philosopher who agrees with them say:
“I deny the names