of the attributes carries the same implications for you as what you have affirmed. Either you deny all the attributes—which is impossible—or you liken Him to created beings—which is impossible—or you affirm them all in a manner unique to Him, in which none resembles Him. In that case, there is no distinction between one attribute and another. Distinguishing between them by affirming one and denying another to avoid likening Him to creation and attributing corporeality to Him is a false position: it distinguishes between like things and renders the two claims contradictory.”

If someone says:
“Rational evidence establishes one but not the other—as when it is said that it establishes life, knowledge, and will, but not pleasure, anger, and similar attributes.”

The answer has several aspects:

(First: The absence of evidence does not entail the absence of what it would establish. Suppose that reason does not establish one of these attributes; neither reason nor revelation establishes its negation either. It therefore cannot be denied. Rather, it must be affirmed if evidence establishes it; otherwise, judgment must be suspended.

(Second: It may be said that rational evidence can be adduced for His love, hatred, wisdom, mercy, and other attributes, just as it can for His will, as has been explained elsewhere.

(Third: It may be said that revelation establishes these attributes, while reason does not negate them. Evidence free of any countervailing proof must therefore be accepted.

If he then says:
“Rather, reason does negate them, because these attributes necessarily entail attributing corporeality to Him, and reason rules that out.”

He is told:
“What is said about these attributes that you deny is like what is said about the attributes that I affirm. For if this necessarily entails