If a man is among those who deny the names and attributes—as do the extreme Jahmiyyah, the Qarmatians, and the philosophers—he must nevertheless affirm that He exists. The deniers then say to him: “You are a corporealist, an anthropomorphist, and a Hashwī! For if He exists, other beings share with Him in the meaning of existence, and that constitutes resemblance; moreover, nothing existent can be conceived of except as a body or something subsisting in a body.”

He would then have to say: “He is neither existent nor non-existent, neither living nor dead,” or: “He is neither existent nor not existent, neither living nor not living.” This entails denying both sides of a contradiction, as well as opposites equivalent to contradictories. This is among the most manifest absurdities according to self-evident reason. Moreover, the logic of their position entails likening Him to impossibilities, for that which is neither existent nor non-existent can have no reality whatsoever—neither existent nor non-existent. Rather, it is merely something conceived in the mind, with no realization in external reality. All this is in addition to the outright disbelief to which he has committed himself.

Even if he were to deny necessary, beginningless existence altogether, then, besides committing the disbelief that is the root of all disbelief, he would be obstinately rejecting self-evident truths. For we observe existing things and know that every existent is either beginningless or originated, and either necessarily existent in itself or contingent in itself and existent through another. Everything originated and contingent in itself exists through another, and thus necessarily requires something beginningless and necessarily existent in itself. Existence therefore necessarily entails affirming a beginningless existent.

Some existence is contingent and originated, as we observe in originated things such as animals and plants. Thus, once it is known by rational necessity that among existing things there is that which is beginningless and necessarily existent in itself, and that which is originated and contingent in itself, these two existents share in what is denoted by the term