Thus arose the doctrine of the Jahmīs who denied the divine attributes. They said:

“Affirming the attributes entails likening Allah to His creation and ascribing corporeality to Him, whereas Allah, glorified and exalted is He, is far above that. For the ‘attributes’—knowledge, power, will, and the like—are accidents and qualities that subsist in something other than themselves. An accident subsists only in a body, and Allah, exalted is He, is not a body. For bodies are never devoid of accidents that come into being, and whatever is never devoid of things that come into being must itself have come into being.”

They said: “This is how we established that bodies came into being. If this argument is invalidated, the proof that bodies came into being is invalidated; consequently, the proof that the world came into being is invalidated, and thus the proof for affirming the attributes is invalidated.”

They said: “Furthermore, if accidents—that is, attributes—subsist only in a body, then that body is composed of parts, and what is composite depends on something other than itself. It cannot be independent of all else and necessarily existent in itself, whereas Allah, exalted is He, is independent of all else and necessarily existent in Himself.”

They said: “Moreover, a body is bounded and finite. If He had attributes, He would therefore be bounded and finite. There would then necessarily have to be something determining why He had one magnitude rather than another. Whatever depends on such a determinant cannot be independent of all else, beginningless, and necessarily existent in itself.”

They said: “Moreover, if attributes subsisted in Him, He would be a body; and if He were a body, He would be like all other bodies. Whatever is possible for them would therefore be possible for Him, and whatever is impossible for them would be impossible for Him. That is impossible with respect to Allah, exalted is He.”