as well as drawing near, being close, rising over, and descending—and even transitive acts such as creating, bestowing kindness, and the like. There are three views:
The first is the view of those who deny this absolutely and in every sense. Nothing pertaining to volition, they hold, can subsist in the Lord. Thus, He does not become pleased with anyone after not having been pleased with him, nor become angry with him after not having been angry, nor rejoice at repentance after it occurs; nor does He speak by His will and power, if that is said to subsist in His very being.
The first known proponents of this view were “the Jahmiyyah and the Mu‘tazilah.” From them it passed to the Kullābiyyah, the Ash‘ariyyah, the Sālimiyyah, and those followers of the four imams who agreed with them. These include Abū al-Hasan al-Tamīmī, his son Abū al-Fadl, and his grandson Rizq Allah; al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn ‘Aqīl, Abū al-Hasan ibn al-Zāghūnī, Abū al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzī, and others among Ahmad’s followers—although an individual among these may make contradictory statements. They also include Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī and others like him among al-Shāfi‘ī’s followers; Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī and a group of Mālik’s followers; and Abū al-Hasan al-Karkhī and a group of Abū Hanīfah’s followers.
The second view affirms this. It is the view of the Hishāmiyyah, the Karrāmiyyah, and other groups of speculative theologians who explicitly used the term “movement.” As for those who affirm it in the broad sense, such that it includes the subsistence of matters and acts