al-Āmidī. Had he brought together what sound reason establishes in the arguments of both groups, he would have found it all consistent with what the Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—brought, and would have found sound reason in accord with authentic transmitted texts. These thinkers, however, did not understand the true nature of what the Messenger brought, and their rational understanding became confused. Their knowledge of both revelation and reason was therefore deficient. If this deficient understanding represents the utmost a person can attain, and he is unable to overcome it, then his inability excuses him: Allah will not punish him if he has exerted every effort. This accords with the position of the early Muslim generations and the leading scholars: whoever fears Allah to the best of his ability will not be punished for failing to know some aspect of the truth that he is unable to grasp.

As for the claim of some Jahmiyyah and others like them that He may punish those who are incapable, and the claim of some Muʿtazilah and other Qadariyyah that everyone who strives must necessarily come to know the truth, and that whoever fails to know it does so through negligence rather than inability—these are two weak positions. Because of them, the various groups among those who face the qiblah have come to declare one another unbelievers and curse one another.

Thus, “Aristotle and his followers,” who affirm unceasing activity and its necessary implications, may be told:

Sound reason does not establish that any particular thing in the world is beginningless, whether a celestial sphere or anything else. It establishes only that the Lord has always been active. Accordingly, if it is supposed that He has always created one thing after another, then everything other than Him would be created, brought into existence, and preceded by nonexistence, and nothing in the world would be beginningless. You have nothing that invalidates this supposition, so why do you reject it? The very measure of action is