is refuted by future events, since whether an event is past or future is a relative matter. For this reason, the leading proponents of this view—such as Jahm and al-ʿAllāf—denied the possibility of an endless succession of future events. Jahm maintained that Paradise and Hell would cease to exist, while al-ʿAllāf maintained that movements would cease. All this is discussed at length elsewhere.

“Another group,” familiar with the arguments of both sides—such as al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and others—came to write works of speculative theology in which they supported what the innovating theologians presented on behalf of the adherents of the religion concerning “the world’s coming into existence.” They did so through this innovated method of the speculative theologians: asserting the impossibility of a beginningless succession of events. Then they would write philosophical works, such as al-Rāzī’s “Eastern Investigations” and similar writings. In these, he sets out the arguments by which the speculative theologians sought to establish that a beginningless succession of events is impossible and that time, motion, and body have a beginning. He then refutes all these arguments, answers them, and substantiates the argument of those who maintain that these things have no beginning.

This is not a deliberate attempt on his part to support falsehood. Rather, he speaks according to what rational evidence appears to support in his own examination and inquiry. Whenever, in the course of his examination, he finds a rational argument that undermines the philosophers’ position, he uses it against them. His habitual approach is unrestricted inquiry according to what becomes apparent to him. Thus, he criticizes the arguments of one group using whatever arguments of the other appear to him to undermine them, and he treats the other group in the same way. Some people think ill of him, believing that he deliberately advances false arguments; but this is not