As for the first premise, namely their statement, “If the act of creation were eternal, the created thing would necessarily be eternal,” this is disputed by those who hold that creation is an eternal act subsisting in the Creator, while the created thing originates in time. This position is held by some among the Kullābiyya, Hanafis, Hanbalis, Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs, Sufis and scholars of hadith. They say: “You agree with us that His will is eternal and beginningless, although what He wills comes later. Likewise, the act of creation is eternal and beginningless, although the created thing comes later. Whatever you say concerning the will, we will bind you to its counterpart concerning the act of creation.” This is a dialectical rebuttal that binds them to the implications of their own position, and they have no way out of it.

As for the second premise, namely their statement, “If the act of creation originated in time and subsisted in the Lord, this would entail that events originating in time subsist in Him, which is impossible,” this is disputed by the early generations, the leading scholars of hadith, the foremost philosophers and many of their early and later representatives, and many speculative theologians, such as the Hishāmiyya and the Karrāmiyya. They say: “We do not concede that this consequence is impossible.” This will be discussed, Allah Most High willing, under the “Second Principle.”

As for the third premise, namely their statement, “If it did not subsist in Him, that would be impossible,” this is disputed only by certain groups of speculative theologians among the Muʿtazila and others. Some of them say: “Rather, the act of creation subsists in the created thing.” Others say: “Rather, the act of creation is not in any substrate,” just as the Basran Muʿtazila speak of “an act through a will that subsists in no substrate.” This is impossible, and I know of no one among the early generations, scholars of hadith, jurists, Sufis or philosophers who held this view.