It is self-evident that there must be a beginningless being whose existence is necessary in itself and whose nonexistence is impossible. For whatever exists is either contingent and originated, or necessary and beginningless. What is contingent and originated can exist only through a necessary, beginningless being. Thus, if the arguments used to deny the established attributes entail denying the necessary, beginningless being, and denying that being entails denying existence altogether, it follows that whoever denies any established attribute through such an argument advances a position that necessarily entails denying the existence of what we plainly observe.

For example, someone may say: “Descent, rising above, and the like are attributes of bodies, for descent and rising above can only be conceived of in a composite body. Allah, glorified be He, is far above these necessary consequences, so He must also be declared free of that which entails them.” Or he may say: “These occur in time, and temporal occurrences can subsist only in a composite body.” Likewise, he may say: “Pleasure, anger, joy, love, and the like are attributes of bodies.”

He is then told: “The same applies to will, hearing, sight, knowledge, and power: they too are attributes of bodies. For just as we can conceive of nothing that descends, rises above, becomes angry, or is pleased except a body, we can conceive of nothing that hears, sees, wills, knows, or decrees except a body.”

If he says: “His hearing is not like our hearing, His sight is not like our sight, and His will is not like our will; the same applies to His knowledge and power,” he is told: “Likewise, His pleasure is not like our pleasure, His anger is not like our anger, His joy is not like our joy, and His descent and rising above are not like our descent and rising above.”