This resembles the dispute over whether attributes are additional to the essence. For whoever means by “essence” the “bare essence,” the attributes are additional to it. But for whoever means the “essence qualified by attributes,” the attributes are not separate from the essence qualified by its inseparable attributes.

These people then claimed that they deny these types of composition. As for the “four types,” whoever holds that they are absent from created beings must hold that they are all the more absent from the Creator. As for the “fourth type,” if the dispute concerns whether attributes are additional to the essence, then it is a verbal dispute. But if someone disputes the actual existence of these attributes, denies that Allah has knowledge, power, and will, and regards one attribute as identical with another, and the attribute as identical with the one it qualifies, then the falsity of his position becomes evident once it is fully understood.

Once it is known that He—glorified be He—is Living, All-Knowing, and All-Powerful, and that what it means for Him to be Living differs from what it means for Him to be All-Knowing, and that what it means for Him to be All-Knowing differs from what it means for Him to be All-Powerful, this is precisely the affirmation of the attributes. If someone says that what it means for Him to be All-Knowing is the same as what it means for Him to possess will, to be All-Powerful, and to be Living, this is a wilful denial of the obvious. The same applies if he claims that these meanings are identical with the meaning of the essence qualified by them.

But if he acknowledges that these qualities belong to Allah and says, “I deny that Allah depends on entities or qualities through which He becomes living, knowing, and powerful,” then his dispute is with those who affirm “states”