the necessary implications of His existence. Their position thus amounts to saying: “He exists but does not exist; He is real but not real; He is a creator but not a creator.” They deny both sides of a contradiction concerning Him, either explicitly denying both or refraining from affirming either. For this reason, their most thoroughgoing exponents—the Qarmatians—deny both sides of a contradiction concerning Him. They do not say that He exists or does not exist, that He is living or not living, or that He is knowing or not knowing.

They say: “Describing Him in affirmative terms likens Him to existing things, while describing Him in negative terms likens Him to nonexistent things.” Their excessive rejection of any likeness thus led them to describe Him in terms of utter negation. Yet they did not escape what they sought to avoid. Rather, by the logic of their own position, they must have likened Him to that which is impossible, which is baser than what exists and what does not exist but could. Thus, while claiming to avoid likening Him to existing and nonexistent things, they described Him with the attributes of impossible things, which cannot exist—unlike nonexistent things whose existence is possible. Likening Him to impossible things is worse than likening Him to existing things and nonexistent things whose existence is possible.

What these heretics sought to avoid is not, in fact, objectionable. For if He is called real, existent, self-subsisting, living, knowing, compassionate, and merciful, and a created being is described by these same terms, it does not follow at all that He is like that created being. Were that true, every existing thing would be like every other existing thing, and every nonexistent thing would be like every other nonexistent thing. Likewise, everything of which an attribute is denied would be like everything else of which that same attribute is denied.