we posit something that is not a body, it would be neither knowing nor ignorant, neither capable nor incapable, and neither living nor dead.” This statement of the Qarmatian is equivalent to the statement of these Jahmiyyah that He is neither within the world nor outside it. The positions of Jahm and the Qarmatians are of the same kind, as the writers on sectarian doctrines have reported concerning both groups: neither “He is a thing” nor “He is not a thing” should be said. Whoever denies of Him these opposites, one of each pair of which must apply to anything that exists, [cannot] conclusively refute the Qarmatians. This is why their arguments against the Qarmatians were weak, as explained at length elsewhere.

The second response is that of someone who says:

“Rather, I say that He does not occupy space and is not in a direction, while also saying that He is separate from the world.”

This is the position of those who say that He is above the world but is neither a body nor a substance, nor does He occupy space. This is maintained by some among the Kullābiyyah, Ashʿariyyah, and Karrāmiyyah, and by those who agree with them among the jurists following the four imams, the scholars of hadith, and the Sufis.

If they are told, “To affirm something separate that does not occupy space contradicts necessary reason,” they reply:

“To affirm an existent that is neither within the world nor separate from it is even more obviously untenable according to necessary reason. If reason’s judgment is accepted, your position is unsound, and the point at issue—that He is separate from the world—is thereby established. If reason’s judgment is rejected, your argument against our position—that He is above the world, separate from it, and neither a body nor a substance—falls apart. And if there is no argument establishing the falsity of