Then, on another occasion, they say: “‘Amr came,” “I saw ‘Amr’s face,” “The horse came,” and “I saw the horse’s face.” The listener understands that these have both a common element and a distinguishing element, and that ‘Amr’s coming and face stand in the same relation to him as Zayd’s coming and face do to Zayd. If it is known that ‘Amr is like Zayd, it is understood that his coming is like Zayd’s coming and his face like Zayd’s face. If, however, it is known that the horse is not like Zayd but resembles him in certain respects, it is understood that its coming and face are not like Zayd’s coming and face, but resemble them in certain respects.

Likewise, when it is said, “The angels came,” and “The prophets saw the angels’ faces,” it is understood that the angels have a coming and faces that stand in the same relation to them as a human being’s coming and face do to him. One’s knowledge of the true nature of these then depends on one’s knowledge of the true nature of the angels. If one knows the angels only in general terms and cannot conceive what they are like, the same applies to their coming and their faces: one knows them only in general terms and cannot conceive what they are like.

The same applies when it is said, “The jinn came.” In all these instances, the words convey their meanings literally. Indeed, if it is said, “The reality and essence of an angel are not like the reality and essence of a jinn,” the terms “reality” and “essence” are used literally of both. They are terms with a common meaning across their applications, even though the things they designate have explicitly been stated not to be alike. Likewise, if it is said, “The wine of this world is not like the wine of the Hereafter, nor is its gold like the gold of the Hereafter, nor its milk like the milk of the Hereafter, nor