rather, their position is that the term “existence” is predicated univocally and that existence is divided into eternal and originated, even while they affirm that the Lord’s existence is identical with His quiddity. For them, the term “existence” is like the term “quiddity.” Just as quiddity and essence are divided into eternal and originated, and the Lord’s quiddity is identical with His essence, so too existence is divided into eternal and originated: the Lord’s existence is identical with His essence, and the servant’s existence is identical with his essence. A thing’s essence is its quiddity.

Thus, “existence” is a univocal term, but when ascribed to either of the two subjects, it becomes specific to that subject. Although the two subjects share the meanings designated by “existence,” “essence,” and “quiddity,” there is nothing common to them in external reality over and above what is particular to each, as Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, and their like suppose. Rather, no unqualified existence, unqualified quiddity, or unqualified essence exists in external reality.

As for the unqualified considered on condition of its being unqualified, these thinkers and others agree that it does not exist in external reality, and that—even assuming this view is authentically attributed to Plato and his followers—it is self-evidently false. As for the unqualified considered without any condition, it may be supposed that it exists in external reality and forms part of a particular entity. This is mistaken. Nothing exists in external reality except particular entities; no unqualified thing exists there as part of a particular entity. However, by “part,” these thinkers mean an essential attribute of the thing described, on the premise that