by a woman, whose view he would then accept. For example, he wanted to set a limit on bridal gifts, so that they would not exceed those given to the Prophet’s wives—may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He said, “Whoever gives more, the excess will be placed in the public treasury.” Muslims would pay the bridal gift before consummating the marriage; they deferred it only rarely.

A woman said, “Commander of the Faithful, why do you deny us something Allah has granted us in His Book?”

He asked, “Where?” She replied, “In His words, Most High:

‘If you wish to replace one wife with another, and have given one of them a great sum, do not take anything back from it.’”

So ʿUmar accepted her view and said, “A woman was right, and a man was wrong.”

In disputed matters, such as questions of inheritance and divorce, he would hold one view, ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib another, ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd another, and Zayd ibn Thābit another. He did not compel anyone to adopt his position; rather, each of them would issue fatwas according to his own view, even though ʿUmar—may Allah be pleased with him—was the leader of the entire Muslim community, the most knowledgeable and devout among them, and the best of them. How, then, could any judge be better than ʿUmar?

This applies when he has ruled on a matter open to independent scholarly judgment. What, then, if his position has never been held by any of the imams of the Muslims—not the four imams, nor the Companions and Successors before them—but is held only by him and others like him who have no knowledge of the Book, the Sunnah, or the views of the early generations and the imams?

They merely judge according to the customs in which they were brought up, like those who said:

“We found our forefathers following a way, and we follow in their footsteps.”

And just as judgments are passed by