If we then extend this principle to divorce and manumission—as may be inferred from our principles, and in keeping with reports from the Companions that manumission was included under a “vow made in obstinacy,” and reports from Tāwūs and others that they regarded an oath of divorce as having no effect, although the narrator was uncertain whether Tāwūs counted it as an oath—this is a sound approach. Indeed, it is the stronger view, if Allah wills. There is no power and no strength except through Allah.

If, however, we distinguish divorce and manumission from declarations of marital prohibition and zihār, that too is a sound approach. In the former case, he makes the actual taking effect of divorce or manumission conditional—something that is not contingent upon an act of will. In the latter, he makes an oath conditional, as though saying: “If I do this, I shall be bound by an oath of marital prohibition or an oath of zihār,” or: “If I do this, I shall become one who has pronounced zihār and declared his wife forbidden to him.” When he becomes someone who has pronounced zihār and declared his wife forbidden to him, this does not itself bring anything into effect; it merely establishes a prohibition removable by expiation. Thus, it becomes like saying: “If I do such-and-such, I shall be bound to perform Hajj,” or: “I shall be a pilgrim,” or: “I shall be in a state of ihrām (ritual consecration).” This, however, requires further consideration and should be carefully examined.