or worship combining physical and financial elements, namely the sacrificial offering.

But it may be objected: “If it is obligatory, one may not eat from it, unlike a voluntary offering.” We reply: There is also disagreement concerning an offering pledged by a vow. As for an offering that becomes obligatory as a specifically designated animal, there is agreement that one may eat from it. For slaughtering for Allah as an offering to His House is the greater of the two objectives. Hence the scholars disagreed over whether its meat must be distributed within the Sacred Precinct. We ourselves require this for a dedicated offering, but not for a ritual sacrifice, thereby giving effect to its designation as an offering: something presented to the Kaaba.

If, then, it becomes clear that the grounds requiring fulfilment remain in place, and that the Lawgiver has merely allowed expiation as a concession—which may itself become obligatory or recommended, as with a person compelled by necessity to eat carrion—then this same rationale applies to a “vow made in obstinacy or anger” and similar cases. It also applies to a man’s saying, “If you do such-and-such, you are forbidden to me.”

This differs from a case in which he intends the prohibition actually to take effect as a punishment for her, such as when he says to her or to her mother: “If you do such-and-such, you are forbidden to me.” Here, his intention is for the prohibition to take effect, just as his intention in a “devotional vow” is for an obligation to take effect, and his intention in a “divorce in return for compensation” is to receive the compensation, and so forth.

This distinction is sound according to our principles. Just as we distinguish between different intentions when someone undertakes a conditional obligation, we should likewise distinguish between them when someone undertakes a conditional prohibition. If he breaks his oath, we should give him the choice between abiding by the prohibition and expiating his oath, just as we give him that choice in the case of a vow.