so rescission removes the ruling consisting of intention or permission. The same applies to promises and threats: what is removed is the ruling consisting of the intention to give or to grant permission. All this arises because some speech combines the meanings of demand and assertion: oaths, vows, promises, threats, and contracts. It is over the rulings governing this composite “third category” that people have differed. For this reason, some have divided speech into assertions and performative declarations, making the latter broader than demands, since a performative declaration establishes either a demand or permission. There is nothing beyond demand and permission, for one calls upon either oneself or another for something to occur or not to occur.

It may also be said that permission entails a demand, since one requires of oneself that the person granted permission be enabled to act. Likewise, undertaking an obligation entails a demand, since one imposes upon oneself a right whose holder may demand its fulfilment as an obligation, whereas in the case of permission one makes it permissible for him. The two thus amount to the same thing. And Allah knows best.

The matter therefore comes down to a demand, an assertion, or a combination of the two. And Allah knows best. All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all worlds.

Section

The principle we have set out clarifies the question of qualifying a declaration of zihār with “if Allah wills.” This concerns a man’s saying, “You are forbidden to me,” or, “You are to me like my mother’s back.”

Ahmad said: “This qualification is valid in such a declaration, since expiation becomes due if he breaks it by returning to her.”

Ahmad’s principle is that wherever expiation is prescribed, an oath is prescribed as well; otherwise, it is not.