than omitting it. This is the meaning of Ahmad’s statement concerning . . . (1) Some of our companions consider it obligatory, whereas the Murji’ah prohibit it. Others may consider omitting it preferable.

Thus, it is variously classified as obligatory, recommended, disallowed—whether prohibited or disliked—prescribed by the Sunnah, or equally permissible either way. What we have explained concerning oaths also clarifies the question of promises and threats: whether they may be abrogated or left unfulfilled. Whoever regards them as assertions says that abrogation would entail falsehood. Another holds that they are assertions incorporating the meaning of a demand.

When someone says, “If you do this, I will strike you,” his words imply, “I now intend to strike you if you do it, and I am informing you of that.” This is therefore not a mere assertion. Abrogation would apply to the demand it contains, giving that demand precedence over the assertion, just as, in the matter of invoking Allah’s will and expiation, the assertion takes precedence over the demand. When speech contains two meanings, one may predominate according to the accompanying considerations.

This is why a distinction is made between leaving a promise unfulfilled and leaving a threat unfulfilled. When a promisor’s words entail requiring himself to fulfil what he has promised in return for something, this is equivalent to undertaking to provide consideration under a contract. It is an obligation he owes another, and he may not annul it. By contrast, the words of someone issuing a threat entail demanding the threatened harm by way of requital. This is equivalent to requiring consideration from another when he himself has rendered what he owes. Whatever another owes him, he may insist upon it or choose not to do so.